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Abstract 
Envy is a destructive emotional state that arises when people encounter others who possess more 
desirable life circumstances than their own. Its opposite is pity, a sympathetic emotion elicited by 
downward social comparisons towards lower-status groups. Both reactions first require people to 
form impressions about what another person’s life must be like. However, the social-cognitive 
principle of focalism suggests that our impressions may be incomplete: we might overweight 
representative target features (i.e., the exceptionally good circumstances of enviable others and 
exceptionally bad circumstances of pitiable others) at the cost of overlooking mundane moments 
of daily life, which likely dilutes the emotional intensity of actually experiencing either 
condition. Three studies support this possibility. In Study 1, participants read about an enviable 
(Study 1a) and pitiable (Study 1b) peer and rated what this person’s daily life might be like. I 
found a significant positive correlation between focusing and the experienced emotion. In Study 
2, I induced participants to feel envy (Study 2a) and pity (Study 2b) while imagining various 
people, which heightened the focalism bias compared to control. Conversely, I manipulated 
focalism in Study 3 by asking participants to complete a “diary” unpacking task that brought to 
mind dull everyday moments that another person likely encounters (e.g., eating/sleeping). As 
expected, defocusing reduced envy (Study 3a); unexpectedly, however, it did not reduce pity 
(Study 3b). Thus, while my results largely confirm a link between focalism and social emotions, 
this link may be stronger for envy than pity. Implications and future directions are discussed.  
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(Mis)Imagining Someone Else’s Life: 
The Role of Focalism in Feeling Envy and Pity Towards Others 
What is your reaction to a person, who is just like you, except that this person is 
exceptionally rich and famous—do you envy them? What about exceptionally poor and alone—
do you pity them? As social beings, we cannot escape the wrath of these perceptions. It is a 
constant barrier that interpersonal interactions require us to cross. My thesis centers around this 
issue. In particular, I explore how people form impressions of both highly desirable others (i.e., 
the people we envy) and highly undesirable others (i.e., the people we pity), and when such 
impressions may be biased. My framework and hypotheses are derived from the existing 
literature on one such bias: the principle of focalism. 
The Focusing Illusion  
Generally, the principle of focalism states that we overestimate how much we will think 
about the occurrence in question (the focal event) and underestimate the extent to which other 
events will also influence our thoughts and feelings. According to Wilson and Gilbert (2005), 
people often base their decisions on affective forecasts, which are predictions about their 
emotional reactions to future events. In doing so, people show an impact bias, in that they 
overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional reactions. A factor of impact bias is 
focalism, which is also the reason that people make incorrect affective forecasts. These biases 
result in people thinking about the focal event in a vacuum, untouched by the consequences of 
the many mundane events that will also inevitably fill their lives. 
However, there are ways to minimize these focalism errors, such as by reducing how 
much people think about the event, which causes people to reframe the event, and by triggering 
affective reactions that compete with the original ones from the event (Wilson, Wheatley, 
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Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000). Additionally, people have a tendency to rely on information 
that is easily accessible to them, without putting much effort into thinking about alternative 
explanations, outcomes, and situations that are less accessible. Making people go beyond what is 
easily accessible to them, by having them think about the many other events that will occur 
alongside the focal one, should theoretically reduce the consequences of focalism. 
A specific defocalization technique, known as the diary method, is an effective way to 
reduce the focalism bias (Wilson et al., 2000). In Wilson et al.’s (2000) study, the diary 
manipulation consisted of having approximately half the participants receive a questionnaire in 
which they were asked to think about a specific day later in the semester and estimate what they 
would be doing that day by filling in 24 blanks, one for each hour of the day. Their results 
consistently supported the focalism hypothesis. At first, college football fans overestimated the 
extent to which the outcome of a game would influence their overall happiness, exemplifying the 
durability bias. However, after completing the defocalizing diary manipulation, the bias was 
greatly reduced. The reminder that one’s day would also be filled with mundane activities helped 
correct the durability bias by changing how much people anticipated the game would dominate 
their thoughts. These findings have considerable practical applications, especially in reducing 
anxiety for upcoming stressful or undesirable events. 
This current paper seeks to extend this idea of the focusing illusion—people’s tendency 
to inflate the value of extreme life circumstances by neglecting the prevalence of the more 
mundane moments involved—to other-oriented social emotions. Although prior work on 
focalism has shed much light on how people think about their own experiences (e.g., affective 
forecasting errors when thinking about the future: Wilson et al., 2000; the overweighting of 
accessible information in evaluative judgment: Schwarz, Kahneman, & Xu, 2009; Suh, Diener, 
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& Fujita, 1996), less work has extended these principles to how people think and feel about 
others. I examined two particularly common and related emotions: envy and pity. 
Envy: A Brief Review 
What would your life be like if you were rich? In love? Living in a sunny beach town? As 
outlined above, many people focally believe that their happiness and wellbeing would greatly 
improve under such conditions. Reality, however, tells a different story. Although people who 
experience positive life changes typically do report better quality of life in the short term, this 
boost tends to fade and return to baseline over time (e.g., see Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; 
Wilson & Gilbert, 2008). One reason why major life events such as these often fail to have 
lasting emotional impact is because our attention gradually shifts to the mundane experiences of 
daily life, distracting us from the big events (Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 
2004). Even the best among us cannot escape long lines and a poor night’s sleep, and yet, these 
everyday incidents exert enormous influence over how we feel in daily life. As Schkade and 
Kahneman (1998) poignantly note, “Nothing in life is quite as important as you think it is while 
you are thinking about it” (p. 345). 
Here I seek to extend this principle to the social emotion of envy1. Envy is generally 
viewed as an unpleasant affective state in which people make upward social comparisons, 
wanting what others have that they objectively lack (Hill, DelPriore, & Vaughan, 2011; Parrott 
& Smith, 1993; Smith & Kim, 2007). People become envious about countless things. For 
example, people may experience envy when thinking about others who are more successful, 
intelligent, or attractive than they are; or for reasons such as loss of affection, rejection, 
suspiciousness, insecurity, and anxiety over time (Wade & Weinstein, 2011). 
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In a comprehensive meta-analysis, Smith and Kim (2007) found that the subjective 
perception of envy is related to feelings of resentment, hostility, and inferiority. Envy has also 
been linked to maladaptive attention patterns, so that envy elicited by a target leads to increased 
attention and later memory retention for specific information about that target (Hill et al., 2011). 
According to the theory of situated cognition, our thought processes are “tuned” to meet the 
requirements of the current task and context (Schwarz, 2007). Following this same idea, attention 
and memory appear to be adaptively tuned to meet an individual’s needs in response to feelings 
of envy, for example, by increasing focus on the target and its environment (Hill et al., 2011). 
Such increased focus can bias judgments, making one feel more envious than is warranted. 
Furthermore, enhancing memory for one stimulus makes people less able to focus on other 
stimuli. Overall, it appears envy can lead to considerable negative consequences. 
However, although much is known about envy and its causes and consequences, less 
literature has distinctly examined the role that focalism may play in envy. According to Correia 
(2012), the influence of negative emotions (such as envy) can cause people to focus too much on 
the negative aspects of an issue, resulting in inaccurate conclusions about the situation. Noting 
the relationship between desirable life circumstances and focalism, Schkade and Kahneman’s 
(1998) study found that people focused too much on stereotypically positive contexts of other 
people (e.g., that they live in California), failing to consider other life circumstances that are not 
particularly special (e.g., that they spend most days in an office). Hence, when thinking about 
enviable others, people may be especially likely to exhibit the focusing illusion, that is, they may 
neglect the routine experiences that others inevitably encounter. Accordingly, these systematic 
errors in thought can have significant consequences if individuals act upon them (Wilson et al., 
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2000). Basing life decisions on such erroneous beliefs and expectations can lead to a life filled 
with choices that undermine, instead of maximize, one’s social and emotional wellbeing. 
By the same logic and on a more comforting note, Wilson et al.’s (2000) defocalization 
technique may work to attenuate the effects of negative emotions, such as envy. For example, 
people tend to get envious when thinking about someone in their field who is more successful 
than them. In relation to the focalism illusion, this situation would be interpreted by the fact that 
we are envious because we are only focusing on the successful moments in that person’s career. 
We only remember them at the peak of their success, oblivious to all the bad events that also 
happened over the course of their career. Conversely, to reduce envy, people might instead work 
to defocalize the situation by turning their attention toward alternative outcomes.  
Together, these studies and ideas led to my first set of hypotheses: that (i) envy may be 
directly associated with the focusing illusion, (ii) inducing envy may exacerbate the focusing 
illusion, and (iii) implementing the diary defocusing task may help attenuate feelings of envy. 
Before turning to the actual studies, however, next I examine the converse social emotion of pity. 
Pity: A Brief Review 
Pity is a mixed affective state in which people make downward social comparisons 
directed at people who experience negative outcomes without control over their occurrence 
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Harris & Fiske, 2006). It is worth noting that while this is the 
definition I have chosen to use in this current paper, it is just one of several definitions of pity. 
Dijker (2001) found pity to be a function of the object’s perceived vulnerability and level of 
suffering. We pity people who we believe are less capable than ourselves. In addition, 
participant’s levels of pity were influenced by age-related, sex-related, and postural vulnerability 
cues, suggesting that people’s appearance influences the arousal of pity (Dijker, 2001). 
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Generally, pity arises when people encounter others who possess less desirable life 
circumstances than their own, whether it be doing poorly academically, struggling financially, or 
having a disability. 
In order to understand the potential prosocial and negative consequences of pity, it is 
important to distinguish the different dimensions of the emotion. Some theorists reason that pity 
is an altruistic emotion because it motivates people to alleviate the suffering of others (Dijker, 
2001). Similarly, pity has been described as an empathy-related emotion: feeling pity for 
someone embodies a sense of compassion and emotional understanding (Wilmer, 1968). In their 
meta-analysis, Eisenberg and Miller (1987) found a positive relationship between empathy-
related emotions, such as pity, and both prosocial and cooperative behavior. While the social 
definition of pity itself implies an emotional distance between the person who pities and the 
person being pitied, it nevertheless can prompt certain helping-oriented behaviors. 
However, there is also literature that discusses the negative dimensions of pity. Boleyn-
Fitzgerald (2003) notes the difference between compassion and pity, stating that compassion 
requires one to feel with someone, while pity only requires one to feel for someone. In this view, 
pity is more emotionally distant; it does not fully require someone to empathetically understand 
the other. Additionally, pity may arise when someone’s suffering is met with fear. In this case, 
Boleyn-Fitzgerald (2003) further suggests that the attempt to alleviate another’s discomfort is 
motivated by the effort to alleviate one’s own discomfort. Ultimately, pitying may be a form of 
negative social judgment, frequently making pitied others feel isolated and inferior from the 
subjective perceptions of the person pitying them. 
Furthermore, Fiske et al.’s (2002) study found that prejudicial stereotypes towards 
specific groups are differentiated by two emotional responses: pity and envy. In regards to envy, 
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high-status, competitive groups that are high in competency, but low in warmth elicit envious 
prejudice (Fiske et al., 2002). Pity prompts paternalistic prejudice, which targets low-status, 
noncompetitive groups that are low in competency, yet high in warmth, such as elders or those 
with a disability (Fiske et al., 2002). According to Fiske et al. (2002), people perceive out-groups 
as deserving of pity when they experience negative outcomes outside of their control. However, 
such pity also justifies subordination and treatment of inferiority, which works to promote the 
status quo and maintain the existing systems of privilege (Fiske et al., 2002). Even seemingly 
positive stereotypes come at the cost of being perceived negatively by others, a prejudicial 
attitude that may fuel negative overt behavior towards pitied others. Recognizing the maintaining 
conditions of pity might allow people to work to correct these biased perceptions. 
Together, these studies led to my second set of hypotheses: that (i) pity, like envy, may 
be directly linked with focalism, (ii) inducing pity may enhance focalism, and (iii) implementing 
the diary defocusing task may attenuate pity in a corresponding way to how it may reduce envy. 
In other words, the emotion of pity may result from people’s tendency to inflate the value of 
negative life circumstances in pitied others by neglecting the prevalence of the more mundane 
moments involved in the pitied person’s life. 
Importantly, there has been relatively little research conducted around the emotion of 
pity, especially compared to the work on envy and how it potentially might relate to focalism. 
This lack of research may be due to current literature’s mixed results as to whether pity can be 
classified as a positive or negative emotion. While pity used to maintain a mostly positive 
connotation, delineating the expression of sorrow for another’s suffering and the capacity for 
moral conscience, a more recent usage of pity suggests a condescending and negative 
connotation toward those seen as “pathetic” (Geller, 2006). Hypothesizing that the same 
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perceptual biases that underlie envy also pervade pity, similar defocalization techniques 
proposed to reduce envy should also reduce pity, in the hopes of tempering these negative 
connotations. For example, having people complete the diary manipulation for someone they 
know who is exceptionally poor or unintelligent may reduce the stigma of pity by reminding 
them that their days may be filled with similar mundane activities. 
Of course, to the extent that reducing pity proves to have antisocial effects (e.g., in 
reducing empathy towards those who actually do need it), the diary defocusing task might serve 
as a detrimental tool. Research into the relationship between pity and focalism is thus especially 
important for several reasons. First, pity is at the root of many prejudicial attitudes, such as 
paternalistic stereotypes, which maintain the negative status quo of these group’s subordination, 
inferiority, and compliance (Fiske et al., 2002). Secondly, pity towards those viewed as lower-
status may lead to hostility and dehumanization towards these groups of people, feeding a 
vicious cycle of abuse (Harris & Fiske, 2006). Lastly, pity has important practical implications as 
it has the capacity to lead to both harmful and prosocial consequences in many different domains 
(Batson, 2011; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Florian, Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2000; Wilmer, 
1968). Identifying the focal mechanisms that increase and reduce pity would allow professionals 
and laypeople alike to learn to regulate and harness the different dimensions of pity, amplifying 
its positive correlates while attenuating its negative ones. 
The Present Research 
In this paper, I sought to extend the principle of focalism to both envy and pity. In terms 
of envy, I examined whether upward social comparisons are driven by the biased perception that 
envied others experience few neutral or negative moments, with a corresponding overestimation 
of the positive. For example, just as people fail to appreciate the impact of a future mundane life 
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when they contemplate buying a dream car, they may envy others who own one for precisely the 
same reason. By the same logic with pity, I examined whether downward social comparisons are 
driven by the biased perception that pitied others experience few neutral or positive moments, 
with a corresponding overestimation of the negative. 
To test these ideas, I explored how closely envy and pity are linked with focusing 
tendencies (Study 1a, envy; Study 1b, pity); whether manipulating people to feel envy and pity 
can increase focalism (Study 2a, envy; Study 2b, pity); and whether implementing a defocusing 
task can reduce the experienced emotions (Study 3a, envy; Study 3b, pity). 
Study 1: More Focusing, More Emotion 
In Study 1, I implemented a correlational design to help establish the general link 
between the focusing illusion and experienced envy (Study 1a) and experienced pity (Study 1b). 
I predicted that focusing and the emotions would be positively associated. 
Study 1a Method 
Participants. I recruited 162 undergraduates (Mage = 18.70; 47.5% female; 71.6% 
Caucasian, 14.8% Asian, 3.1% Black/African American, 10.5% Other) at a large Midwestern 
university to participate in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Procedure. Participants were invited into the laboratory in private individual sessions to 
complete a study ostensibly about imagination. First, they read the following description of 
“Student X”, a fictional character who possessed various enviable circumstances: 
Student X, an undergraduate here at your school, keeps a busy social life with lots of 
friends and very little time alone. Student X also maintains a strong GPA while being 
able to save some energy for going to the gym and staying in good physical shape. To 
this point, a number of people regard Student X as rather attractive. 
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After reading about Student X, participants responded to 5 focusing-related questions and 5 
envy-related questions, which were presented in random counterbalanced order. Then, they 
reported demographic information and were debriefed. 
The 5 focusing items, prefaced with the phrase “If you had Student X’s life…”, were: 
“How many problems would you have in general?” (1 = none at all to 7 = a lot); “How easily 
would good things come to you?” (1 = not easily to 7 = very easily); “How often would you be in 
a bad mood?” (1 = never to 7 = always); “How bothered would you be by little annoyances?” (1 
= not at all to 7 = very much); and “How often would you experience negative events?” (1 = 
never to 7 = always). These questions were based on previous studies that highlight specific 
components of the focusing illusion (e.g., underestimations of bad mood and perceptions that life 
is easy: Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2006). 
The 5 envy items were as follows: “How envious do you feel of Student X’s life 
overall?” (1 = not very envious to 7 = very envious); “How much jealousy do you feel from 
reading about Student X?” (1 = none at all to 7 = a lot); “How much do you want Student X’s 
life?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very much); “How happy do you feel when imagining yourself with 
Student X’s circumstances?” (1 = not very happy to 7 = very happy); and “How inferior do you 
feel to Student X?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). As with the focusing items, these questions 
were based on previous work that specifies individual elements of envy-related affect (e.g., 
feeling inferior: Parrott & Smith, 1993). 
Study 1a Results and Discussion 
The focusing questions (α = .71) and envy questions (α = .84) were collapsed into 
composite scales. Envy items were not recoded because they are in the same direction. I did 
recode the focusing items, however, with higher scores indicating more focalism. 
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As expected, the more focusing tendencies that participants exhibited (M = 4.59, SD = 
.79), the more envious they felt towards Student X (M = 3.91, SD = 1.31), r = .23, p = .003. 
When examining the influence of demographic variables on this relationship via regression, I 
found a marginal effect of ethnicity (p = .10) and significant effects of age (p = .033) and sex (p 
= .006), such that non-Caucasian, younger, and female participants reported greater envy than 
Caucasian, older, and male participants. These results conceptually replicate previous studies on 
group-level differences in the prevalence of envy-related emotionality (e.g., Hill & Buss, 2008; 
Salovey & Rodin, 1991). Importantly, however, the relationship between focusing and envy 
remained highly significant when controlling these variables, β = .25, p = .001. Envying others 
thus appears to be strongly associated with the perception that those in question experience many 
more positive than negative or neutral events, in line with traditional accounts of focalism.  
Study 1b Method 
Participants. I recruited 80 Amazon Turk participants (Mage = 31.79; 48.8% female; 
71.3% Caucasian, 10.0% Asian, 10.0% Black/African American, 8.8% Other) to complete an 
online study in exchange for $0.10. 
Procedure. The procedures were identical to Study 1a. However, participants read a 
different scenario about “Student X” that involved various pity-inducing circumstances: 
Student X keeps a quiet social life with few friends and lots of time alone. Student X also 
maintains a weak GPA yet has little energy for going to the gym and staying in good 
physical shape. To this point, a number of people regard Student X as rather unattractive. 
After reading about Student X, participants responded to 5 focusing-related questions and 5 pity-
related questions, which were presented in random counterbalanced order. Then, they reported 
demographic information and were debriefed. 
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The 5 focusing items were identical to Study 1a. The 5 pity items were as follows: “How 
much help do you want to give Student X?” (1 = a little bit of help to 7 = as much help as 
possible); “How much pity do you feel for Student X?” (1 = not much to 7 = very much); “How 
sorry do you feel for Student X overall?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very); “How much sympathy do 
you feel from reading about Student X?” (1 = none at all to 7 = a lot); and “How sad do you feel 
when imagining yourself with Student X’s circumstances?” (1 = not at all to 7 = very). As with 
the focusing items, these questions were based on previous work that specifies individual 
elements of pity-related affect (e.g., feeling sorry and sympathetic: Harris & Fiske, 2006). 
Study 1b Results and Discussion  
The focusing questions (α = .81) and pity questions (α = .85) were collapsed into 
composite scales. Pity items were not recoded because they are in the same direction. As in 
Study 1a, I did recode the focusing items, with higher scores indicating more focalism. Focalism 
was recoded to be in line with pity, such that higher scores on the focalism scale corresponded 
with higher levels of pity.  
As expected, the more focusing tendencies that participants exhibited (M = 5.38, SD = 
.93), the more pity they felt towards Student X (M = 4.96, SD = 1.23), r = .26, p = .021. When 
examining the influence of demographic variables on this relationship via regression, I found no 
effects of gender (p = .93), age (p = .45), or ethnicity (p = .94), and the relationship between 
focusing and pity remained significant when controlling these variables, β = .27, p = .018. I 
chose to use “Student” language in the pity scenario with this study population in order to be 
consistent with Study 1a, and for the life conditions to make sense (e.g., “bad GPA”). The non-
student population is likely not a problem because the effect remains when controlling age.  
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Pitying others thus appears to be associated with the perception that those in question 
experience many more negative than positive or neutral events, in line with the focusing illusion. 
As expected, these patterns are identical in the converse way for envy (i.e., envy is associated 
with the perception that those in question experience many more positive than negative or neutral 
events). In the next study, I sought to extend these correlational links in an experimental design 
that directly manipulated emotions. 
Study 2: Emotion Exacerbates Focusing 
In Study 2, I manipulated feelings of envy (Study 2a) and pity (Study 2b) to examine 
their cause-and-effect relationship with focusing tendencies. I predicted that inducing people to 
express either emotion would actually cause them to exhibit a greater focalism bias. 
Study 2a Method 
Participants. I recruited 66 undergraduates (Mage = 19.03; 45.5% female; 65.2% 
Caucasian, 13.6% Asian, 13.6% Black/African American, 6.1% Other) at a large Midwestern 
university to participate in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Procedure. Participants completed a laboratory study in private individual sessions 
ostensibly about judgment and multitasking. They were asked to imagine 6 different enviable 
others, who otherwise were described as being very similar to the participant in nearly every way 
(people tend to feel envy for similar—not dissimilar—others: Schaubroeck & Lam, 2004): 
someone who lives in a sunny city, an exceptionally rich person, an exceptionally famous 
person, an exceptionally popular person, an exceptionally attractive person, and an exceptionally 
smart person. No other details were provided. These domains were chosen because prior studies 
have used them to show the focusing illusion (e.g., overestimating life satisfaction when 
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imagining life in sunny California: Schkade & Kahneman, 1998). For each target, participants 
responded to the same 5 focusing items from the first study. 
Before making any ratings, however, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (ns = 33). In the neutral condition, participants were presented with the following 
instructions: “Take an objective perspective towards what is described. Try not to get caught up 
in your feelings and emotional reactions when imagining each person’s life. Try to remain 
objective and detached when thinking about each person.” Conversely, participants in the envy 
condition were instructed: “Take an envious perspective towards what is described. Consider 
your feelings and emotional reactions when imagining each person’s life. Embrace the envy 
triggered when thinking about each person.” This manipulation was adapted from a large 
literature on emotional empathy, in which researchers assess the consequences of empathic 
feelings by instructing participants to “take an empathic perspective” and “embrace the empathy” 
(versus taking a neutral, detached stance) while completing a task (e.g., Toi & Batson, 1982). 
As a manipulation check at the end of the study, all participants rated how much they 
experienced 7 different feelings while rating the targets: envy, happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
surprise, and guilt (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). Finally, they reported demographic 
information and were debriefed. 
Study 2a Results and Discussion 
First, the manipulation worked. Envy participants did not significantly differ from neutral 
participants on experienced happiness (p = .42), sadness (p = .15), anger (p = .10), fear (p = .32), 
surprise (p = .26), or guilt (p = .18). However, they did experience significantly more envy (M = 
4.30, SD = 1.67) than neutral participants (M = 2.70, SD = 1.79), t(64) = -3.77, p < .001, d = 
0.92. This significant finding for envy could be due to experimental demand.  
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For the primary analysis, the 5 focusing items were collapsed and recoded for each of the 
6 targets—as in Study 1—with higher scores indicating greater focusing on this global composite 
index (α = .76). As expected, envy participants exhibited significantly more focusing tendencies 
(M = 4.67, SD = .56), inflating the value of positive life circumstances by neglecting the 
prevalence of everyday neutral and negative experiences, than did neutral participants (M = 4.41, 
SD = .48), t(64) = -1.98, p = .052, d = .50: see Figure 1). Moreover, Univariate ANCOVA 
analyses with sex, age, and ethnicity added simultaneously as covariates revealed that the effect 
of the envy manipulation on focalism remained highly significant when controlling these 
demographic variables, F(1, 65) = 5.39, p = .02, η = .08; neither sex (p = .30), nor age (p = .20), 
nor ethnicity (p = .45) exerted an effect. 
Thus, as expected, participants who were randomly assigned to express envy were more 
likely to neglect the everyday neutral and negative experiences in the lives of enviable others, 
compared to control participants. 
Study 2b Method 
Participants. I recruited 31 undergraduates (Mage = 18.84; 51.6% female; 61.3% 
Caucasian, 12.9% Asian, 12.9% Black/African American, 12.9% Other) at a large Midwestern 
university to participate in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Procedure. The procedures were identical to Study 2a. However, participants were asked 
to imagine 6 different pitiable others: someone who lives in a town that is known for bad weather 
all year round, an exceptionally poor person, a person not famous or known for anything 
positive, an exceptionally unpopular person, an exceptionally unattractive person, and an 
exceptionally unintelligent person. For each target, participants responded to the same 5 focusing 
items. 
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Before making any ratings, however, participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions (ns = 15). In the neutral condition, participants were presented with the following 
instructions: “Take an objective perspective towards what is described. Try not to get caught up 
in your feelings and emotional reactions when imagining each person’s life. Try to remain 
objective and detached when thinking about each person.” Conversely, participants in the pity 
condition were instructed: “Take a pitying perspective toward what is described. Consider your 
feelings and emotional reactions when imagining each person’s life. Embrace the pity triggered 
by thinking about each person.” This manipulation mirrors the one that I used in the prior study. 
As a manipulation check at the end of the study, all participants rated how much they 
experienced 7 different feelings while rating the targets: pity, happiness, sadness, anger, fear, 
surprise, and guilt (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely), as in Study 2a. Finally, they reported 
demographic information and were debriefed. 
Study 2b Results and Discussion  
First, the manipulation worked. Pity participants did not significantly differ from neutral 
participants on experienced happiness (p = .22), anger (p = .57), fear (p = .65), surprise (p = .77), 
or guilt (p = .39). While the difference between pity and neutral participants on sadness (p = 
.063) is not significant, it is near-significant, which suggests that this experiment did indeed 
manipulate the construct of pity (versus other pity-related emotions, such as contempt). 
However, pity participants did experience significantly more pity (M = 5.19, SD = 1.22) than 
neutral participants (M = 3.53, SD = 1.68), t(29) = -3.14, p = .004, d = 1.13. Again, this 
significant finding for pity could be due to experimental demand. 
For the primary analysis, the 5 focusing items were collapsed and recoded for each of the 
6 targets, with higher scores indicating greater focusing on this global composite index (α = .62). 
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As expected, pity participants exhibited significantly more focusing tendencies (M = 4.67, SD = 
.32), inflating the value of negative life circumstances by neglecting the prevalence of everyday 
neutral and positive experiences, than did neutral participants (M = 4.25, SD = .54), t(29) = -2.58, 
p = .015, d = .95: see Figure 2). Moreover, Univariate ANCOVA analyses with sex, age, and 
ethnicity added simultaneously as covariates revealed that the effect of the pity manipulation on 
focalism remained highly significant when controlling these demographic variables, F(1, 30) = 
7.59, p = .011, η = .23; neither sex (p = .26), nor age (p = .15), nor ethnicity (p = .61) exerted an 
effect. 
Note that this alpha is relatively low, and as can be seen in Figure 2, the effect appears to 
be strongest specifically for three targets: the person who lives in a bad weather city (Mcontrol = 
3.77, SDcontrol = .73; Mpity = 4.83, SDpity = .49; t(29) = 4.71, p < .001, d = 1.70), the person who is 
unknown (Mcontrol = 3.75, SDcontrol = 1.09; Mpity = 4.54, SDpity = .82; t(29) = 2.29, p = .03, d = 
.82), and the person who is unintelligent (Mcontrol = 4.05, SDcontrol = .87; Mpity = 4.45, SDpity = .81; 
t(29) = .74, p = .20, d = .48). This observation suggests that the emotion-focalism link may be 
stronger for particular domains. I return to this point in the General Discussion. 
These results expand upon Study 1 by providing experimental evidence for a cause-and-
effect relationship between emotion and the focusing illusion. Participants who were randomly 
assigned to express envy were more likely to neglect the everyday neutral and negative 
experiences in the lives of enviable others, whereas participants who were randomly assigned to 
express pity were more likely to neglect the neutral and positive experiences for pitied others. 
Study 3: Decreasing Emotion By Defocusing 
 In Study 3, I extended the findings of the first two studies in a number of important ways. 
First, I tested for bidirectional effects, that is, whether manipulating focusing can cause changes 
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in emotion (rather than manipulating emotion as in the prior study). I specifically assessed 
whether manipulating people to defocus can decrease emotion. Second, participants thought 
about enviable and pitiable others in their own lives rather than fictional targets, to further boost 
real-world relevance. Third, participants specified how they perceived good, bad, and neutral 
events in the lives of others, to explore how focusing actually operates to influence emotion. 
Finally, I included measures of trait envy and trait empathy to test if their relationship to 
focalism is limited to a particular subgroup (e.g., people who are naturally very emotional). 
In Study 3, participants were induced to “defocus” their thoughts while thinking about 
enviable others (Study 3a) and pitiable others (Study 3b). I predicted that defocusing would lead 
people to feel less emotion towards others, and that this reduction would be driven by changes in 
perceptions of how often the others in question experience positive, negative, and neutral events. 
Study 3a Method 
Participants. I recruited 160 undergraduates (Mage = 18.61; 67.5% female; 66.3% 
Caucasian, 15.0% Asian, 7.5% Black/African American, 11.3% Other) at a large Midwestern 
university to participate in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Procedure. Participants completed a laboratory study in private individual sessions 
ostensibly about how people form impressions of others. They were randomly assigned into one 
of two conditions. Participants in the control condition (n = 81) were asked to think of a real 
person in their actual lives (i.e., not a celebrity or public figure) about whom they felt envious. 
They wrote this person’s initials and then listed up to 5 reasons for their envy. Common 
responses included getting good grades, finding an easy time making friends, and having wealthy 
parents. Then, they were asked to rate “How envious do you feel of this person’s life overall?”, 
from 1 (I’m not very envious) to 9 (I’m extremely envious). 
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Participants in the diary condition (n = 79) followed the same procedures, except they 
completed a “diary” task before making the rating. Similar manipulations have been used in a 
handful of previous studies beyond Wilson et al. (2000) to successfully induce defocusing (see 
Ayton, Pott, & Elwakili, 2007; Hoerger, Quirk, Lucas, & Carr, 2009, 2010; Sevdalis & Harvey, 
2009). In the task, participants were asked to imagine a realistic, average day in the envied 
other’s life. They were asked to generate lists of at least one likely activity for each hour within a 
24-hour period, starting with 6:00 AM - 7:00 AM. Hence, the goal of the task was to bring to 
mind the many inevitably mundane moments that the envied other encounters during a typical 
day (e.g., sleeping, eating, commuting), which should therefore reduce envious feelings if envy 
is indeed driven by focalism bias. After this task, diary participants rated the same envy item as 
participants did in the control condition. 
Next, all participants were asked to estimate what percentage of the envied other’s life is 
filled with good moments, neutral moments, and bad moments, adding up to 100%. They also 
completed the 8-item Dispositional Envy Scale2 (Smith, Parrott, Diener, Hoyle, & Kim, 1999;     
α = .86). A sample item is, “Frankly, the success of my neighbors makes me resent them.” Each 
question was rated from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Finally, participants 
reported demographic information and were debriefed. 
Study 3a Results and Discussion 
Reducing envy. As expected, reducing focalism decreased feelings of envy. Diary 
participants experienced significantly less envy (M = 4.09, SD = 1.87) than did control 
participants (M = 5.00, SD = 1.99), t(158) = 2.98, p = .003, d = .47. Moreover, Univariate 
ANCOVA analyses with sex, age, and ethnicity added simultaneously as covariates revealed that 
the effect of the diary manipulation on envy remained significant when controlling these 
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demographic variables, F(1, 159) = 8.97, p = .003, η = .06; neither sex (p = .17) nor age (p = .78) 
exerted a significant effect. Ethnicity, however, did have an unexpected effect (p = .02), such that 
Caucasians reported the highest envy regardless of condition. Although this result conflicts with 
the ethnicity pattern observed in Study 1, I suspect that any differences by ethnicity in my studies 
should be viewed with caution given the small sample sizes of my non-Caucasian participants. 
Future research might fruitfully explore potential ethnic differences beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
Interestingly, the effectiveness of the “diary” task in reducing experienced envy did not 
depend on participants’ dispositional envy. There were no differences in trait scores between 
control (M = 2.19, SD = .80) and diary participants (M = 2.28, SD = .81), t(148) = -.64, p = .52, d 
= .11. Condition, trait envy, and the condition × trait interaction were thus entered as predictors 
of experienced envy via regression. Although there was an effect of trait such that more envious 
people indeed felt more envy (β = .64, p = .008), the interaction was not significant (β = -.29, p = 
.23). Thus, the diary manipulation may be effective regardless of people’s initial propensities to 
feel envious—which suggests a potential fix for envy-related problems in general, not limited to 
a particular subgroup. 
Mediation. In line with my proposed framework, the diary manipulation also led to 
downstream differences in perceiving the envied other’s life. Defocusing did not lead diary 
participants to infer a greater proportion of negative moments (M = 14.94%, SD = 9.32%) than 
control participants (M = 16.14%, SD = 7.67%), t(158) = .89, p = .38, d = .14. However, diary 
participants did perceive a decrease in positive moments (M = 41.94%, SD = 16.95%) compared 
to control participants (M = 55.27%, SD = 18.71%), t(158) = 4.72, p < .001, d = .75, and a 
corresponding increase in neutral moments (M = 42.87%, SD = 16.97%) compared to control 
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participants (M = 28.59%, SD = 16.34%), t(158) =  -5.42, p < .001, d = .86. Hence, defocusing 
brought to mind the mundane moments in otherwise exceptional circumstances, as reflected in 
people’s increased estimates of neutral and decreased estimates of positive events. 
Accordingly, these differences fully mediated the effect of the diary manipulation on 
experienced envy. To simplify my test for mediation, I created a difference score by subtracting 
neutral estimates from positive estimates, comprising a “life events” index.3 Diary participants 
thought their envied others led less pleasant and more mundane lives (M = .94, SD = 32.57) 
compared to control participants (M = 26.68, SD = 34.29), t(158) = 5.22, p < .001, d = .83. 
Regression-based mediation analyses (Baron & Kenny, 1986: see Figure 3) showed that 
condition significantly predicted envy (β = -.23, p = .003), but not when controlling perceived 
life events (β = -.13, p = .11); conversely, perceived life events predicted envy (β = .31, p < 
.001), even controlling condition (β = .26, p = .002). The indirect effect of the diary manipulation 
on experienced envy, through perceived life events, was significant (95% bootstrap confidence 
interval = -.70 to -.14, which excludes the value 0; see Preacher & Hayes, 2004). In other words, 
mundane everyday life events brought to mind via defocusing were the precise reasons why 
participants were led to feel less envy. 
Study 3b Method 
Participants. I recruited 65 undergraduates (Mage = 18.58; 58.5% female; 72.3% 
Caucasian, 7.7% Asian, 6.2% Black/African American, 13.8% Other) at a large Midwestern 
university to participate in exchange for subject pool credit. 
Procedure. The procedures were identical to Study 3a. Participants in the control 
condition (n = 32) were asked to think of a real person in their actual lives (i.e., not a celebrity or 
public figure) that they pitied. They wrote this person’s initials and then listed up to 5 reasons for 
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their pity. Common responses included getting poor grades, not having many friends, and 
experiencing financial hardships. Then, they were asked to rate “How much pity do you feel 
towards this person’s life overall?”, on a scale from 1 (I don’t feel very much pity) to 9 (I feel an 
extreme amount of pity). Participants in the diary condition (n = 33) followed the same 
procedures, except they completed the “diary” task before making the rating. All participants 
then completed the same three percentage estimates as in Study 3a, and also completed the 28-
item Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1983), which captures four distinct dimensions of 
dispositional empathy on individual 7-item subscales: Empathic Concern (α = .79) measures 
people’s other-oriented feelings of sympathy for the misfortunes of others, and as such is a more 
emotional component of empathy (e.g., “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me”); Perspective Taking (α = .82) is a more cognitive or intellectual component, 
measuring people’s tendencies to imagine other people’s points of view (e.g., “I sometimes try to 
understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective”); Fantasy (α 
= .84) measures people’s tendencies to identify imaginatively with fictional characters in books 
or movies (e.g., “I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel”); and 
Personal Distress (α = .81) measures more self-oriented feelings of distress during others’ 
misfortunes (e.g., “When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces”). 
Each item was rated from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well). Finally, 
participants reported demographic information and were debriefed. 
Study 3b Results and Discussion 
Reducing pity. The primary hypothesis was not supported in this study: Diary 
participants had a similar level of pity (M = 5.67, SD = 2.16) as control participants (M = 5.69, 
SD = 1.60), t(63) = .044, p = .97. Adding demographic variables as covariates via Univariate 
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ANCOVA analyses did not change this finding: the effect of condition remained non-significant 
(p = .96), and neither sex (p = .60), age (p = .38), nor ethnicity (p = .78) exerted an effect. One 
likely explanation for this null finding is that pity and other empathy-related emotions have a 
strong social desirability component, in that few people would explicitly admit to not feeling bad 
for the misfortunes of others (see Davis, 1983). Given that participants in this study were asked 
to think about real people in their own lives rather than fictional targets (as in Studies 1-2), this 
social desirability explanation may apply. Another explanation for this null finding may be that 
even the mundane moments in particular types of pitied others day-to-day lives may be 
objectively difficult (e.g., a poor person who cannot afford a car must take the bus or rely on 
rides everyday). Thus, bringing to mind mundane moments for these types of people would still 
result in experienced pity. This highlights the possibility that severe misfortune truly is worse, 
and it may change the mundane details of your life more than good fortune does.  
Dispositional empathy. In terms of dispositional empathy scores, there were no 
Empathic Concern differences between control (M = 3.63, SD = .63) and diary participants (M = 
3.88, SD = .69), t(63) = -1.52, p = .13; no Fantasy differences between control (M = 3.38, SD = 
.87) and diary participants (M = 3.51, SD = .76), t(63) = -.60, p = .55; and no Personal Distress 
differences between control (M = 2.94, SD = .75) and diary participants (M = 2.80, SD = .69), 
t(63) = .79, p = .43. There was, however, an unexpected effect of Perspective Taking, such that 
diary participants reported having significantly greater trait Perspective Taking tendencies (M = 
3.56, SD = .66) as compared to control participants (M = 3.14, SD = .75), t(63) = -2.40, p = .019, 
d = .58. This finding is somewhat odd given that participants were randomly assigned across 
conditions; perhaps something about the extended task, such as the “diary” task itself being an 
act of perspective taking, put diary participants in a more cognitive or intellectual-oriented 
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mindset, thus changing their cognitive empathy. If so, this unexpected artifact might help explain 
why the diary manipulation did not lead to the primary predicted effect on the pity outcome 
measure. However, there was no significant interaction between Perspective Taking and 
condition (p = .25), and the null effect remains when controlling for Perspective Taking and each 
of the other empathy subscales (ps > .90).   
Percentage estimates. Despite this null effect, I did observe significant effects on the 
percentage estimates in line with the proposed framework. Defocusing did not lead diary 
participants to infer a greater proportion of positive moments (M = 24.70%, SD = 15.41%) than 
did control participants (M = 27.66%, SD = 14.93%), t(63) = .78, p = .44. However, diary 
participants did perceive a decrease in negative moments (M = 27.27%, SD = 20.73%) compared 
to control participants (M = 37.03%, SD = 18.37%), t(63) = 2.00, p = .049, d = .49, and a 
corresponding increase in neutral moments (M = 48.03%, SD = 22.11%) compared to control 
participants (M = 35.31%, SD = 16.28%), t(63) =  -2.63, p = .011, d = .65. Hence, as expected, 
defocusing brought to mind the inevitably mundane moments in otherwise poor circumstances, 
as reflected in people’s increased estimates of neutral and decreased estimates of negative events. 
In sum, Study 3 provides a number of important insights that may speak to potential 
boundaries of the role of focalism in interpersonal perception, particularly in terms of differences 
in perceiving undesirable (versus desirable) conditions. In terms of envy, the diary manipulation 
indeed led people to feel less envious of desirable others. Given that envy has been shown to 
produce many destructive interpersonal consequences (Larson, Clore, & Wood, 1999; Van de 
Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011), Study 3a thus has implications for improving real-world 
wellbeing. In contrast, diary and control participants felt equally bad for pitied others regardless 
of the diary manipulation. Interestingly, I still found significant effects on percentage estimates, 
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meaning that the diary manipulation indeed had its predicted effect (i.e., that it brought to mind 
more mundane moments in pitied others’ lives)—but thinking about mundane moments did not 
then reduce overall experienced pity. This finding suggests that simply knowing about a handful 
of negative events in someone else’s life is enough to drive people to feel bad for them, even if 
people are made aware of neutral or positive events in their lives. In contrast, the envy studies 
suggest the opposite: bringing to mind neutral or negative events does “water down” the 
impressiveness of others’ positive circumstances. Thus, there may be a broader asymmetry at 
work in how people react to good versus bad experiences in others’ lives: the bad looms much 
larger, and is much harder to dismiss, than the good. This observation is promising, in that it 
suggests people’s prosocial emotions (e.g., empathy and some dimensions of pity) may be more 
difficult to reduce than destructive social emotions (e.g., envy and jealousy). 
General Discussion 
Do you envy your successful friend? Do you pity your unsuccessful friend? The above 
studies indicate that if someone feels these emotions towards others, they do so because they 
exaggeratedly focus on the particularly positive and negative circumstances in the other person’s 
life, while neglecting the inevitable mundane life events that the person will also experience. 
Essentially, not being able to see the full picture leads people to form biased perceptions of 
enviable and pitiable others. Defocusing one’s thoughts by intentionally bringing to mind the 
many other mundane events also impacting that person’s day-to-day life may help a person 
recognize the similarities between themselves and these others. If this is the case, defocusing 
could help to close the in-group versus out-group gap that can produce negative consequences. 
Overall, the results from these studies indicate a relationship between social emotions and 
the focusing illusion. Results from Study 1, which investigated the link between focalism and 
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emotion, indicated a positive correlational relationship between the two variables: the more 
focusing tendencies the participants exhibited, the more envy and pity they felt towards the 
fictional “Student X.” Results from Study 2, which used an experimental design to directly 
manipulate emotion, indicated that inducing people to express envy and pity increased focalism. 
Thus, experiencing these emotions leads people to overly neglect the routine experiences that 
others inevitably encounter by focusing on the positive and negative aspects of the person’s life. 
Lastly, results from Study 3, which implemented a defocusing manipulation, found that the 
“diary” task did increase estimates of neutral moments in both the envied others’ life and the 
pitied others’ life. However, these estimates only helped to decrease envy, and did not change 
overall experienced pity. In other words, after defocusing, participants were able to recognize 
that the pitied others also experienced everyday mundane experiences in addition to the negative 
events, yet, knowing this did not lead people to feel any less bad for the person. This asymmetry 
suggests an interesting split across valence within the emotion-focalism link: more “antisocial” 
emotions (like envy) may be easier to attenuate than more “prosocial” emotions (like empathy). 
In general, however, the results collectively suggest a robust link between focalism and emotion. 
Theoretical Insights 
A bidirectional, causal relationship between social emotions and focalism suggests 
various theoretical implications. While there has been prior research about how people think and 
feel about themselves, almost no research has extended the principles of focalism to how people 
think and feel about others. These studies suggest that interpersonal focalism is rooted in 
differences in how people estimate the percentage of positive, negative, and neutral experiences 
that others encounter. Interestingly, the main “action” in both sets of studies appeared to occur 
with neutral experiences. With the envy studies, people seemed to generally believe that negative 
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events are unlikely to happen to others—even after defocusing. And similarly with the pity 
studies, people seemed to believe that positive events are unlikely to happen to others, even after 
defocusing. These valence-specific nuances help build a more precise understanding of how 
focalism actually operates, highlighting which particular aspects of perceiving others drive our 
evaluations of them (i.e., the unobserved power of neutral everyday moments). Indeed, at a more 
general level, the felt intensity of various emotions might be just as driven by the things people 
are not thinking about as by how much they attend to the principal event at hand. 
In terms of the envy and pity literatures themselves, the current studies clearly suggest 
that these emotions need not depend on objective differences between self and other, but merely 
entail the subjective belief that they exist. To my knowledge, prior studies have not made this 
point explicitly, not even in a recent thorough meta-analysis of envy (Smith & Kim, 2007). That 
envy and pity actively create perceptions of inequality (as in Study 2), and are not just reactions 
to objective inequality, significantly broadens the literature’s scope—not only by suggesting new 
domains in which pity and envy should have influence, but also how past findings interact with 
other variables. For example, cultural differences in envy (Hupka et al., 1985), its relationship 
with self-esteem (Salovey & Rodin, 1991), and its effects on memory and cognition (Hill et al., 
2011) may all be importantly moderated by people’s focusing tendencies, as might be pity’s 
relationships to prejudicial attitudes and social judgments (Fiske et al., 2002; Florian et al., 2000; 
Harris & Fiske, 2006), and prosociality (Batson, 2011; Dijker, 2001; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; 
Wilmer, 1968). 
Practical Implications 
Perhaps most important, the current findings pose novel recommendations for addressing 
various real-world consequences of both envy and pity. For example, envy’s destructive real-
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world effects have been well-documented (Larson et al., 1999; Van de Ven et al., 2011). In turn, 
one prominent theory identifies three primary coping strategies to alleviate these envious feelings 
(see Salovey & Rodin, 1988): self-reliance (i.e., trying to simply persevere, resting assured that 
one’s feelings will pass), self-bolstering (i.e., trying to think about and emphasize one’s positive 
qualities), and selective ignoring (i.e., trying to avoid thinking about enviable others). These 
strategies may work to the extent that one’s envy is rooted in objective inferiority; if one can 
never actually become a rich celebrity, redirecting attention to other things seems reasonable. 
The current studies, however, suggest a more counterintuitive strategy, given that envy also 
seems to stem from subjective perceptions: think a lot about enviable others, in order to add their 
less-than-enviable banalities of everyday life into one’s perception. Of course, future work 
should test if this observation holds true under more naturalistic conditions, such as examining 
whether the diary manipulation can help decrease envy over time via longitudinal interventions, 
and whether it still works for people who suffer from serious envy regulation problems (e.g., 
certain clinical samples). Nevertheless, the fact that I found no interactions in any of my studies 
with gender, age, ethnicity, and even trait envy provides initial evidence that the effects could 
beneficially extend beyond the laboratory. 
In terms of pity, the current findings pose novel recommendations for addressing pity’s 
both positive and negative real-world effects, in line with previous findings (Batson, 2011; 
Boleyn-Fitzgerald, 2003; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Fiske et al., 2002; Florian et al., 2000; 
Wilmer, 1968). For instance, this research may have important value for health-related fields. 
According to Boleyn-Fitzgerald (2003), there are potential negative consequences of pity for 
both the doctor and patient. For the doctor, too much pity can lead to burnout, injustice, and 
inefficiency; for the patient, being pitied implies a judgment of being pitiful. These negative 
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social judgments may exacerbate the patient’s suffering. However, it is impractical (and arguably 
immoral) for doctors not to experience any empathy or pity. Furthermore, pity has potential 
positive consequences as well, such as allowing doctors to take the perspective of the patient, to 
care for the patient, and to be motivated to alleviate the suffering of the patient (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987; Wilmer, 1968). Educating doctors about the relationship between focalism and pity 
gives them the tools to be able to attenuate some of the negative side effects associated with the 
emotion, as well as harness its positive potential, benefiting both the doctor and patient.  
Thus, the relationship between focalism and pity may have the power to promote 
prosocial behaviors. The altruistic element of pity, in its empathetic power, can be harnessed to 
motivate helping behavior and cooperation among groups of people, especially in young children 
who are just developing perspective-taking (Florian et al., 2000). Another prosocial benefit 
would be the use of the focalism-pity relationship in a therapeutic setting. The logic of focalism 
can be used to help people who are struggling with emotions, such as pity or envy. For example, 
there exists such a thing called “Emotions Anonymous,” which is similar to Alcoholics 
Anonymous, except for people who struggle to regulate their emotions (e.g., see Emotions 
Anonymous, 2014). The principles of focalism, and more specifically, the process of 
defocalization, can be used on people such as those in Emotions Anonymous to see if it is 
possible to reduce real negative emotions with actual problematic consequences. Applying the 
results from this research to actual practice would be a great starting point for future 
interventions. Future research should continue to conduct and replicate experiments that 
demonstrate how individuals can counteract the biased consequences reflected in the relationship 
between focalism and other-oriented emotions. I hope my experiments call to the larger need in 
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the field of psychology to integrate basic theories informed through research into applied 
theories that can be practically used to better individual’s lives within the real world. 
Strengths and Limitations 
I believe that these studies are valuable because they go beyond how people think about 
their own experiences in the future and examine how similar psychological principles (focalism) 
might apply to how people think and feel about others. Additionally, they help add to the small 
amount of current literature on the emotion of pity (especially compared to the envy literature), 
providing valuable insight into the thought processes behind this emotion. Furthermore, the 
results from these studies are especially useful because they tested the hypothesis across 
correlational and experimental methods and measures. Utilizing this diverse array of tools can 
allow one to feel more confident about the relationship between emotion and focusing. 
 However, there are possible limitations that may have had an impact on the results. At a 
conceptual level, there may be many important moderators to the general effect. For example, as 
can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the life domains have different levels of impact on emotion, 
even though I observed the overall main effect across domains. Future work might fruitfully 
explore these domain-specific differences, and examine when the focalism effect is most robust. 
An additional limitation is the low external validity of my study population. Almost all of 
the samples included White college students, and thus may not generalize to other populations. 
Future research should sample from a larger or more diverse population.  
One practical limitation is a small sample size. For instance, the sample size in Study 3b 
may have been too small for there to be enough power to detect the effect, possibly explaining 
the reason for the study’s null effect on reducing pity. Another possibility for the insignificant 
results from Study 3b, given the emotionally reactive nature of the stimuli and the self-report 
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method of the study, may have been the social desirability component mentioned previously. If 
participants have a tendency to describe themselves in a favorable light, and societal norms 
imply that we should feel bad for those less fortunate than us, then they may have been hesitant 
in admitting lower levels of pity (Davis, 1983; De Jong, Pieters, & Fox, 2010). Future work may 
be able to better account for social desirability by asserting the anonymity of the study more 
strongly to the participants, or by using randomized response models that help correct for social 
desirability biases (De Jong et al., 2010). Lastly, as also mentioned previously, the insignificant 
results found in Study 3b may be due to the type of misfortune in the pitied person’s life. For 
example, on a daily basis it may take a disabled woman an hour to get dressed, and then hours of 
waiting for transportation services to take her to work. In this case, her misfortune is objectively 
worse, and it may change the mundane details of her life more than other types of experiences 
might. 
Concluding Thoughts 
Taken together, my research on focalism and its relation to envy and pity helps provide 
novel insight into our consciousness’s perceptive biases that we are often blind to on a day-to-
day basis. If nothing else, these findings may make us stop and think about the affective states of 
others and ourselves. This allows us to understand that everyone, regardless of how rich or 
famous they are, experiences a variety of mundane daily events, and that the way we perceive 
other’s negative life circumstances may be inaccurate. Most importantly, it teaches us that 
perception is a subjective artifact created by our own consciousness, which optimistically implies 
that we also have the power to deconstruct the potentially hurtful perceptions we hold of others. 
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Notes 
1.  A rich subcomponent of the envy literature seeks to disentangle envy from jealousy: jealousy 
is typically viewed as stemming from the threat of losing a current possession, whereas envy 
results from wanting something that one does not currently possess (e.g., see Parrott & Smith, 
1993). In the current paper, I treat the two constructs as essentially interchangeable, as my 
hypothesis should not theoretically depend upon this distinction. 
 
2. The idea to include a trait scale did not arise until after I had already collected data from 10 
participants. Thus, analyses including the scale are limited to N = 150; all others include the full 
N = 160. Eliminating the first 10 participants does not change any result. 
 
3. Individual mediations show similar patterns. Condition no longer predicts envy when 
controlling for good events (β = -.15, p = .067) or neutral events (β = -.12, p = .13), whereas 
good events (β = .23, p = .005) and neutral events (β = -.27, p = .001) still predict envy after 
controlling for condition. Hence, using a difference score between these two allows for more 
interpretable analyses. Bad events did not predict envy on its own (β = -.04, p = .61) or when 
controlling for condition (β = -.02, p = .76), but condition still predicted envy when controlling 
for bad events (β = -.23, p = .004)—which is why I omitted them from the index. 
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Figure 1. Focalism bias when thinking about each target (Study 2a). Participants were randomly 
assigned to take a neutral or envious perspective (between-subjects); I then assessed how much 
focusing (i.e., inflating the value of positive life circumstances by neglecting the prevalence of 
everyday neutral and negative experiences) they exhibited when thinking about different types of 
enviable others (within-subjects). Higher bars represent greater focusing. Error bars ±1 standard 
error. 
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Figure 2. Focalism bias when thinking about each target (Study 2b). Participants were randomly 
assigned to take a neutral or pitying perspective (between-subjects); I then assessed how much 
focusing (i.e., inflating the value of negative life circumstances by neglecting the prevalence of 
everyday neutral and positive experiences) they exhibited when thinking about different types of 
pitied others (within-subjects). Higher bars represent greater focusing. Error bars ±1 standard 
error. 
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Figure 3. Results of multiple regression mediation analyses (Study 3a), with condition as the 
independent variable (1 = diary, 0 = control), estimated proportion of life events that the envied 
other encounters as the mediator (positive - neutral), and experienced envy as the dependent 
variable. The βs in parentheses were obtained from a model that included both the independent 
variable and mediator as predictors of the dependent variable. 
 
